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The tercentenary of the
birth of David Hume
(1711–76) provides an
opportunity for an
appraisal of the
outstanding figure of the
Scottish Enlightenment
and one of the
University’s most
distinguished alumni. In an age marked
less than our own by rigid disciplinary
boundaries and narrow specialism,
Hume wrote as a philosopher, social
scientist and historian. It is in the first of
these fields that his reputation ranks
highest – many today would regard him
as the leading British philosopher.
Hume may be characterised as a
sceptical naturalist. Rationalist justification
of some of our most intuitively held beliefs
– the independent world of physical
objects, our conscious selves, other
minds, the objectivity of moral and
aesthetic values – is not achievable.
These are subject to sceptical attack
throughout his writings. At the same time,
he argues, we find ourselves inescapably
committed to believing in these, largely
through the force of ‘custom and habit’.
Understanding these natural processes
gives us better insight into who we are
and how we should live, although this
results in a more deflated view of the world
and our place in it than that attempted by
the projects of other philosophers.
It is in the study of religion that Hume’s
scepticism has been most influential. The
Enlightenment may have flourished on
the soil of Scottish Presbyterianism –
several of its leading figures being
clergymen – but Hume provides
sustained criticism of religious belief and
practice. As a young man, Hume
appears decisively to have rejected all
brands of institutional Christianity. If at
times concealed, his religious scepticism
is prevalent in his writings.
The standard argument for God’s
existence in the 18th century was the
design argument. It was claimed that
evidence of order and harmony in the
planetary motions, in organs such as the
human eye, and in the adaptation of
species to environment all signified
intelligent design by God. In face of this,
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In contrast to the tone of much of today’s
new atheist literature, Hume wrote calmly
and in urbane mood. His writings bear
the marks of lucidity and humour, while
he succeeded in maintaining friendships
with many of the leading moderate clergy
of his day. Given that in 1745 he was
refused a Chair in Edinburgh largely on
account of clerical objections, this was no
small achievement. The understanding of
science, art, ethics, religion and
consciousness may continue to generate
fundamental disagreement, but the lasting
significance of Hume’s contribution to
these debates is not in doubt.
David Fergusson is Professor of Divinity
at the University of Edinburgh and author
of Faith and Its Critics: A Conversation
(Oxford University Press, 2009). As part
of the University’s Hume tercentenary
celebrations, Professor Fergusson will
present a lecture called ‘Hume as
Religious Sceptic’ on Friday 30 September.
Visit www.ed.ac.uk/about/video/lecture-series/hume/introduction
for full details of the Hume-related events
planned to mark the anniversary.
Hume weakens the argument by a range
of criticisms that ever since have set the
terms of the debate. These are set out in
his posthumous work Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. The
appearance of design may be explained
by other hypotheses, he argues, or
perhaps there is no explanation at all,
with the ancient Epicurean philosophy of
chance remaining a possibility. Moreover,
even if design is conceded, the designer
may have attributes quite different from the
God of classical Judeo-Christian theism.
And, in any case, the world appears to
contain many design flaws. Improvements
can easily be conjectured, thus further
diminishing the inference to a perfect deity.
In an essay on miracles, he argues that
reports of these are never credible and
ought always to be dismissed in favour of
some alternative explanation. The weight
of evidence required to give credence to
a reported miracle will also be less than
the probability attached to some other
account of what really happened.
When dealing with the actual history of
religious belief and practice, Hume
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argues that this too is best explained in
natural terms by a process of projection,
of attributing agency to hidden causal
processes and of seeking to promote our
tribal identities through aggrandising
local conceptions of the deity. In all this,
Hume expresses a preference for the
polytheism of the Graeco–Roman world.
Its belief and practices are preferable,
largely because they are harmless and
more hospitable to virtues such as
tolerance and generosity.
Was Hume an agnostic or an atheist?
While there may be a residual commitment
to the possibility of God at the end of
Dialogues, it seems that this notion must
remain distant and imprecise to human
intellects. Moreover, it ought not to exercise
any influence upon the way we live in
society or understand ourselves. To this
extent, Hume is practically an atheist and
he appears to have lived (and died) quite
cheerfully and without recourse to religious
affections or sensibilities. The sense of
God that animated other thinkers as
different as Pascal, Hegel and Wittgenstein
is largely absent from his writings.
